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The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a goal 
embedded in the ILO Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,
1 and 
which has now been widely adopted by the international community. 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach the goal, the ILO 
pursues  a  Decent  Work  Agenda  which  comprises  four  interrelated  areas:  Respect  for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations of this integrated approach and related 
challenges are contained in a number of key documents: in those explaining and elaborating 
the concept of decent work
2, in the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), and in 
the Global Employment Agenda. 
The  Global  Employment  Agenda  was  developed  by  the  ILO  through  tripartite 
consensus of its Governing Body’s Employment and Social Policy Committee. Since its 
adoption in 2003 it has been further articulated and made more operational and today it 
constitutes the basic framework through which the ILO pursues the objective of placing 
employment at the centre of economic and social policies.
3 
The  Employment  Sector  is  fully  engaged  in  the  implementation  of  the  Global 
Employment Agenda, and is doing so through a large range of technical support and 
capacity building activities, advisory services and policy  research. As part of its research 
and  publications programme,  the  Employment  Sector  promotes  knowledge -generation 
around key policy issues and topics conforming to the core elements of the Global 
Employment Agenda and the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of 
books, monographs, working papers, employment reports and policy briefs.
4 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of  research  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  various  departments  and  programmes  of  the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf 
2 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: Decent 
work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out of poverty 
(2003). 
3 See http://www.ilo.org/gea. And in pa rticular:  Implementing  the  Global  Employment  Agenda: 
Employment strategies in support of decent work, “Vision” document, ILO, 2006. 
4 See http://www.ilo.org/employment. 
  José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 
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Employment effects of the 2008/9 global economic crisis have differed significantly 
across countries. As a consequence, an active public debate has emerged on the impact of 
external shocks and the role of public institutions and policies in mitigating them. We 
contribute to this debate by analyzing the role of integration into the global economy and 
different labour market institutions during past phases of global economic downturns as 
well as domestic banking and debt crises. We find that domestic debt and banking crises 
were much more severe in terms of their impact on employment than global economic 
downturns.  On  average,  the  reduction  in  employment  growth  was  more  than  twice  as 
strong. Openness to trade is found to have initially deepened the contractionary effects on 
employment, but also allowed for a faster recovery. High severance pay dampened the 
employment  effects  of  both  domestic  crises  and  global  economic  downturns.  High 
unemployment benefits were associated with stronger reductions in employment growth, 
but the effect seems to be non-linear and driven mainly by countries in the highest 20
th 












1.  Introduction 
In 2009, world GDP contracted by 1.1%. The economic slowdown was truly global in 
the sense that growth declined in every region of the world in comparison to 2007. While 
the Developed Economies, Central and Southern Europe, the former Soviet countries, as 
well as Latin America and the Caribbean experienced actual recessions, the Rest of the 
World  experienced  lower,  but  still  positive  growth.  The  highest  growth  rates  were 
accomplished in East Asia (+6.1%) and South Asia (+5.0%). While global employment 
growth was still positive in 2009 (+0.7%), it also slowed down substantially in all regions 
of the world except for the Middle East, and turned negative in the most affected regions 
(Developed Economies, Central and Southern Europe and CIS). 
Table 1: Change in GDP and employment growth during the 2008/9 crisis 
 
Source: ILO Global Employment Trends Jan. 2010 
 
The latest preliminary estimates for 2009 from the ILO's Global Employment Trends 
(Jan 2010) suggest an increase in global unemployment by 0.9 percentage points to 6.6%. 
While  the  increase  is  strongest  in  the  Developed  Economies  (+2.6%)  and  Central  and 
Southern Europe and CIS (+2.0%), all regions of the world experienced an increase in the 
unemployment rates due to the slowdown in employment growth. 
The 2008/9 crisis clearly had a negative impact on employment, and with growth 
recovering around the world, a central question to policy makers remains what the recovery 
process  of labour  markets  is  likely  to  look  like  and  what  policies  can  help to  support 
recovery and buffer future shocks. We attempt to provide some answers to these questions 
by looking at previous global economic downturns as well as domestic crises and analyze 
their  impact  on  employment  and  the  following  recovery  process.  We  also  analyze  the 
impact of a number of institutional variables related to labour markets and the integration of 
a country into the global economy on employment growth during crises. Specifically, we 
seek  to  answer  the  following  questions:  What  explains  the  apparent  differences  in  the 
employment  impact  of  past  downturns and  crises? Is  employment  growth  in a  country 
integrated into the global economy more sensitive to shocks? Does economic integration 
lead to a more rapid recovery? And how do different labour market institutions affect the 
ability of a country to cushion employment growth against external shocks?  
2.   Literature review 
The topic of this paper is related to two strands of literature. The first one deals with 
the question of how openness to trade affects the strength and depth of a crisis, whether 
domestic or imported from abroad. The second one deals with the question of how a given  
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shock affects the labour market and the role of labour market institutions in coping with 
shocks.  
In the context of a global crisis, openness to trade is considered one of the channels for 
the propagation of the crisis. Several authors, including Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick 
and Rose (1998), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that trade links are the most 
important channels of propagation of economic crises. Among the most recent papers in 
this  literature,  Kali  and  Reyes  (2005)  combine  a  network  approach  with  data  on 
international trade linkages in order to map the global trading system as an interdependent 
complex network, with the countries as nodes and trade relationships as links between 
them.  The  authors  use  the  structure  of  the  international  trade  network  as  a  proxy  for 
different types of country ties, including credit arrangements and financial flows. Using the 
network  approach,  the  authors  find  that  a  crisis  is  amplified  to  other  countries  if  the 
epicenter  country  is  better  integrated  into  the  trade  network.  They  also  find  that  other 
countries affected by such a shock are in turn better able to dissipate the impact of the 
shock if they are well integrated into the network. With respect to the 2008/9 crisis, Rose 
and Spiegel (2009) analyze the role of three types of linkages with the US as the origin of 
the crisis: trade linkages, foreign asset exposure, and international credit. They do not find 
any strong evidence that linkages with the US can be associated with the incidence of the 
crisis. Instead, Baldwin (2010) argues that the decline in world trade during the 2008/9 
crisis was synchronized across almost all important trading countries as global production 
networks reacted to rising uncertainty and companies around the world postponed whatever 
investments and purchases they could postpone. Thus, exposure to trade in general, rather 
than exposure to a certain market, was probably more important for transmission of the 
crisis.      
In the context of a domestic crisis, Berman (2009) looks at two channels through 
which  a  crisis  affects  exports:  A  change  in  relative  prices,  which  affects  net  exports 
positively, and a financial effect which reduces net exports due to the presence of a fixed 
cost to exports and foreign currency borrowing. He empirically shows that currency crises 
affect exports negatively, and it takes around six years for exports to return to their natural 
level. This is particularly true for firms highly dependent on external finance or facing high 
entry fixed costs to exporting. Similarly, Iacovone and Zavacka (2009) analyze the impact 
of financial crises on export growth. They distinguish between a supply and a demand 
channel. The authors show that banking crises affect export growth negatively in sectors 
more heavily dependent on external finance or characterized by a lower share of tangible 
assets. The authors also show that supply side effects are distinct to the effects owing to a 
drop in demand.  
In conclusion, openness to trade seems to play an important but somewhat ambiguous 
role both during global and domestic crises. A trade-off seems to exist between exposure to 
trade as a source of vulnerability to external shocks vs. importance of access to world 
markets for a quick recovery. Similarly, ambiguity may also result from the smoothening of 
domestic crises through currency depreciation that can boost net exports vs. drying up of 
external  finance  that  can  disproportionately  reduce  exports.  While  trade  shocks  can  be 
specific to a certain market, it appears that in the case of the 2008/9 crisis the trade shock 
was a global phenomenon.  
A number of previous papers have analyzed the impact of different types of crises on 
employment, but mainly focused on domestic crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), using a 
sample of thirteen countries, show that as a consequence of a financial crisis, on average, 
unemployment rises for almost five years, with an increase in the unemployment rate of 
about  7  percentage  points  at  the  peak.  Knoteck  II  and  Therry  (2009)  find  that 
unemployment in the US rose between 1 and 4 percentage points during past crises. After 
the two most recent recessions (1990-91 and 2001), unemployment did not decline until 16 
months after the official end of the 1990-91 and 20 months after the 2001 recession (jobless 
recovery). Potential reasons provided by the literature are: a) Long expansion in 1980s and  
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1990s delayed the organizational restructuring of firms b) The fact that mild recessions are 
followed by weak recoveries, thus firms suspend the hiring process, and c) labour market 
changes, in particular the fact that temporary layoffs more frequently become permanent 
layoffs and that just-in-time employment practices (such as using overtime and temporary 
contracts)  have  become  more  prominent.  Forceri  and  Mourougane  (2009)  find  that  in 
OECD countries, past crises had permanent effects on employment by increasing structural 
unemployment  rates.  A  potential  explanation  could  be  hysteresis  in  unemployment,  a 
concept first raised by Blanchard and Summers (1986) and recently strongly supported by 
Ball (2009). Among the possible avenues for hysteresis effects they discuss are a) insider-
outsider effects where wage-bargaining is dominated by the currently employed and thus 
wages are set at a higher level than what would allow unemployment workers retrenched 
during the crisis to be re-hired b) a negative impact of long-term unemployed on workers' 
skills. To sum up, the literature indicates that crises can have severe, long-lasting, and in 
some cases even permanent effects on labour markets. 
With  respect  to  role  of  labour  market  institutions,  Blanchard  and  Wolfers  (2000) 
provide  an  explanation  of  the  observed  increasing,  yet  heterogeneous  patterns  of 
unemployment  in  European  OECD  countries  by  interacting  domestic  economic  shocks 
(including total factor productivity and real interest rate) and labour market institutions. 
They find that indicators of labour market institutions such as the replacement rate, the 
length  of  unemployment  benefits  and  employment  protection  all  increase  the  surge  in 
unemployment resulting from a given economic shock. Using a similar approach, Bertola et 
al. (2001) find that the relative decline in the unemployment rate in the US compared to 
other OECD countries can be explained by the interaction of shocks and more flexible 
labour market institutions, especially with respect to the transmission of shocks to real 
wages. Duval et al. (2007) find that policies and institutions associated with rigidities in 
labour and product markets dampen the initial impact of shocks but make their effects more 
persistent. Additionally, Caballero et al. (2004), based on a sample of 60 countries, find that 
employment protection legislation, if properly enforced, slows down the process of creative 
destruction  and  thus  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  employment  to  shocks.  Furceri  and 
Mourougane  (2009)  argue  that  institutions  increasing  labour  market  rigidity  such  as 
employment  protection  legislation  significantly  increase  the  impact  of  an  economic 
downturn on structural unemployment. However, these studies focus on economic changes 
such as fluctuations  in  total factor  productivity  and  the  real  interest rate  which  do  not 
constitute short-term, mean-reverting phenomena, but bring upon permanent changes and 
thus require substantial adjustments in the economy. Thus, they are quite different in nature 
to a temporary drop in demand resulting from a global economic downturn or the short 
term  impact  of  a  banking  or  debt  crisis.  Furthermore,  the  finding  that  labour  market 
regulation  leads  to  higher  unemployment  effects  of  shocks  is  not  undisputed  in  the 
literature. For example, Baccaro and Rei (2007) and Baker et al. (2004) reject a systematic 
relation  between  labour  market  institutions  and  higher  unemployment,  while  Nunziata 
(2002)  finds  a  direct  impact  of  labour  market  institutions  on  unemployment,  but  not 
through  interaction  with  crises.  Bassanini  and  Duval  (2006)  find  that  unemployment 
benefits,  tax  wedges  and anti-competitive  product  market  regulation  increase  aggregate 
unemployment, while highly centralized and/or coordinated wage bargaining systems are 
estimated  to  be  associated  with  lower  unemployment.  Abbritti  and  Weber  (2009) 
emphasize the importance of differentiating between institutions that affect the rigidity of 
employment and those that affect the rigidity of real wages. They argue that the two have 
opposite effects in the sense that real wage rigidity increases the unemployment resulting 
from  external  shocks  such  as  an  oil  price  increase  while  institutions  that  lead  to 
employment rigidity reduce it. Freeman (2007) concludes from a general literature review 
that  labour  institutions  do  not  generally  impede  economic  adjustment.  All  the  studies 
reviewed are for OECD countries only, which is probably mainly due to the fact that until 
recently,  the  only  panel  dataset  on  labour  market  institutions  with  a  reasonable  time 
dimension was for OECD countries. These papers are typically based on panel regressions 
with unemployment as the endogenous variable, different combinations of shock and labour 
institutions measures as well as their interactions in some cases, and different specifications  
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with respect to country-fixed effects. The definition of shocks varies substantially, but most 
studies use some country-specific definition of shocks and thus focus on the impact of a 
shock once it has reached the domestic economy rather than global shocks.  
With  respect  to  the  2008/9  crisis,  Eichhorst  et  al.  (2010)  argue  that  employment 
protection legislation was effective in mitigating the employment losses in a number of 
OECD countries, but also warn that in some instances this increased the phenomenon of 
labour market duality because the main burden of adjustment was born by workers with 
non-standard  contracts  (such  as  temporary  employment)  for  which  protection  does  not 
apply.  
On the effects of labour market institutions in non-OECD countries, Botero et al. 
(2004) investigate the impact of employment laws, collective bargaining and social security 
laws on a sample of 85 countries and find that heavier regulation of labour is associated 
with  a  larger  unofficial  economy,  lower  labour  force  participation,  and  higher 
unemployment.  Djankov  and  Ramalho  (2008)  support  this  view  based  on  an extensive 
literature  review  of  recent  findings  on  the  impact  of  labour  regulation  in  developing 
countries and their effects on employment. On the other hand, Berg and Cazes (2009), 
based on a literature review on market failures and undesirable social outcomes associated 
with de-regulated labour markets, contradict the conclusions of Botero et al. (2004). Their 
analysis rather suggests that a number of labour market regulations, including minimum 
wages, employment policy, and regulation of maximum working hours, produce beneficial 
externalities that would lead to market failure if these regulations were to be removed. 
Most of the literature on the role of labour market institutions has focused on long-
term  employment  growth  or  the  impact  of  shocks  that  are  somehow  permanent  on 
unemployment. There does not appear to be a consensus at this point. Perhaps the main line 
of debate is between the ability to adjust to shocks on one hand and the potential social 
costs associated with very flexible labour markets on the other. We believe that this debate 
points to the importance of understanding the exact nature of a crisis, in particular whether 
it induces a permanent shock – which would require adjustment – or temporary effects, in 
which case the argument for protecting existing employment becomes stronger.    
Our study adds to the literature in a number of ways. First, we extend the discussion of 
the  role  of  labour  market  institutions  in  adjusting  to  economic  shocks  to  developing 
countries. Second, instead of focusing on the unemployment rate, we use total employment 
growth as our dependent variable. This has the advantage that it allows us to isolate the 
direct effect of a crisis or downturn on employment by filtering out the effect on labour 
force  participation  which  is  not  feasible  when  using  the  unemployment  rate.  These 
fluctuations can be sizable during times of crisis. For example, the latest data from the ILO 
Global Employment Trends (January 2010) indicate that labour force participation declined 
by up to 1.4% in Sri Lanka while increasing by 0.8% in Estonia during the 2008/9 crisis. 
Third,  we simultaneously  investigate  the  impact  of both  global  downturns  and  country 
specific crises. This is highly relevant with regard to the 2008/9 crisis, as the pattern in 
which the crisis affected some countries combined elements of a global economic downturn 
and a domestic banking or debt crises. 
3.  Stylized facts from past global economic 
downturns and domestic crises 
Figure  1  shows  annual  world  GDP  growth  since  1980  in  order  to  identify  past 
episodes of global economic downturns. One can clearly see slowdowns of GDP growth in 
1980-1982  (second  oil  shock,  Volcker  deflation),  1991-1993  (Gulf  War),  1998  (Asian 
crisis) and 2001 (.com bubble and 9/11), even though none of them reached the magnitude 
of the downturn in 2008/9. As discussed in the data section, our employment growth data  
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reaches  from  1980  to  2008.  Thus,  given  that  we  need  at  least  two  years  of  lagged 
employment  growth  to  carry  out  our  estimations,  the  downturn  in  1980-82  is  not  an 
effective part of our sample.  
Figure 1: Episodes of global downturns 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
The following figures show average employment growth around these past episodes of 
global economic downturns, as well as for country specific domestic debt and banking 
crises during the same time period (as defined by Laeven and Valencia 2008). The graphs 
are  based  on  predictions  from  a  fixed  effect  regression  of  employment  growth  on  the 
respective  leads  and  lags  of  the  two  types  of  crises  dummies.  Thus,  we  differentiate 
between the two different types of events and control for their potential simultaneity as 
global  downturns  frequently  are  the  trigger  for  underlying  structural  problems  in  an 
economy to lead to an acute debt or banking crisis. In the presence of country specific 
banking and debt crises, employment growth dropped dramatically at the inception of the 
crisis and took on average three years before returning to the pre-crisis level (Figure 2 left 
panel). For global downturns, the decline in employment growth was less steep and only 
reached its low point in the second year before returning to pre-crisis levels in year three 
(Figure 2 right panel). For domestic crises, there appears to be a catch-up phase of faster 
employment growth after the crisis, peaking in year four since the beginning of the crisis.  
Figure 2: Average employment growth patterns around domestic crises (left) and global downturns (right)  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Developing countries show a smaller drop and faster recovery after domestic crises in 
comparison  with  developed  countries  (Figure  3  left  panel).  On  the  other  hand,  global 
downturns generally affected employment growth in developing countries slightly more 
severely (Figure 3 right panel). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that emerging markets 
generally face lower unemployment owing to financial crises. They argue that this is due to 
higher  wage  flexibility.  However,  the  main  factor  explaining  the  stronger  impact  in 
industrialized  countries  is likely  to  be the  differences  in  mechanisms  to  cope with job 
losses:  In  the  absence  of unemployment  benefits  and  social protection,  most  people  in 
developing  countries  can  simply  not  afford  to  be  unemployed  and  thus  revert  to  self-
employed or casual employment activities if they lose their formal job. Thus, during a 
crisis, the growth rate of informal employment tends to increase in developing countries, 
compensating for job losses in the formal economy, which leaves the impression of a lower 
overall impact if one does not differentiate between formal and informal employment. 
Across countries of the same income group, the impact of global economic downturns 
on  employment  has  also  varied  considerably.  For  example,  during  the  1981/2  global 
economic downturn and the following debt crisis in many developing countries, Chile and 
Korea, at roughly similar per capita income levels (Chile US$ 2,900, Korea US$ 1,800) 
went through very different patterns of employment growth. While employment growth in 
Chile  contracted  sharply  at  the  onset  of  the  crisis  but  recovered  quickly,  Korea's 
employment  growth  declined  more  slowly,  but  remained  low  for  four  years.  Among 
industrialized countries, the United States experienced employment contraction in 1982, but 
returned to employment growth around 3% p.a. relatively quickly. Italy experienced a less 
sizable contraction of employment in 1982, but employment growth remained sluggish long 
after the crisis was over.  
Figure 3: Average employment growth patterns in developed vs. developing countries around domestic 
crises (left) and global downturns (right) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
A number of factors are likely to affect the impact of a global slowdown or domestic 
crisis on a country's labour market. Among the most important ones are labour market 
institutions and the state of a country's integration into the world economy. The literature 
provides arguments for multiple channels through which trade openness and labour market 
institutions affect employment growth in times of crisis which are rather complex and in 
some cases may go in opposite directions. The question which of these channels dominate – 
and how this perhaps differs at different phases of a crisis – is thus an empirical one which 
our methodology is designed to address.   
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4.  Data  
For the definition of the global downturns we take a similar approach to Freund (2009) 
who identifies 1982, 1991, and 2001 as episodes of past global economic downturns. We 
however relax her definition slightly by considering downturns based on a less profound 
reduction  in  world  GDP,  yielding  1998  as  an  additional  global  downturn  period.  The 
definition  of  domestic  crises  is  taken  from  Laeven  and  Valencia  (2008)  and  refers  to 
whether  a  country  has  either  a  debt  or  a  banking  crisis  in  the  respective  year.  The 
employment data is taken from the ILO's Laborsta and Key Indicators of the Labour Market 
databases.  We  include  all  countries  for  which  we  could  construct  a  consistent  and 
continuous time series of total employment growth for at least 10 consecutive years within 
our observation period 1980-2008. However, we do not make use of the TREND model 
simulations in the Key Indicators of the Labour Market database due to the well-known 
difficulties with estimating empirical models based on data that was itself generated based 
on a modelling exercise. The openness measure is given by the trade (imports + exports) 
over GDP ratio taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Labour 
market institutions indicators are taken from an extensive new dataset collected by the 
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti. The labour market institutions measures in this dataset 
probably have the widest available coverage due to the longer time dimension compared to 
the EPL restrictiveness index of the Doing Business Report of the World Bank
5 and the 
wider country coverage compared to the OECD's measure s used in most previous studies 
on the role of labour market institutions . Our particular interest here is in a measure of 
employment protection which captures the  costs of laying off workers and a measure of 
unemployment benefits. While overall Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indices 
are usually a composite of various dimensions of labour regulations, we prefer to focus on 
the dimension which makes lay -offs costly, since this is likely to   impact employment 
adjustment directly in times of crises. Several overall   EPL measures also include the 
difficulty of implementing overtime work. To  the extent that this is positively correlated 
with the general flexibility of adjusting working time, restrictiveness along this aspect is 
more likely to lead to job losses rather than helping to preserve jobs.  The measure we 
employ is the severance pay in terms of months of salary an employer has to pay in case of 
dismissal. This data exists for workers that have been employed  since nine months, four 
years or 20 years. To use all the information of the  three maturities we take the principal 
component of the t hree employment  lengths. The resulting measure (and the single 
dimensions) of lay-off costs are highly correlated with the measure (for employees that 
have been working since three years for a company) constructed by Botero et al. (2004) and 
several other sub-indices of their EPL measure, including the administrative  difficulty of 
dismissal. It is however negatively correlated with the difficulty of implementing overtime 
work, which explains the lower   positive correlation with their overall EPL index. The 
measure of unemployment benefits also comes from the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti 
and reflects the Gross Replacement Rates, defined as levels of statutory entitlements over  
average wages after the first year of unemployment. The calculation closely follow s the 
methodology of the OECD, which provides the same measure for a smaller sample of 
countries.  
The  analysis  has  some  clear  limitations.  One  limitation  is  the  availability  of 
employment data with a sufficient time dimension. Our  sample contains 50 countries that 
fulfil the above described criterion of minimum employment data availability (at least ten 
 
 
5  Note  also  that  the  “Employing  Workers”  indicator  of  the  Doing  Business  Report  is  currently 
undergoing  revisions  in  response  to  criticism  related  to  its  definition  and  application  in  policy 
dialogue (see for instance Berg and Cazes (2007) and Lee et al. (2008)).   
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consecutive  years  within  the  observation  period).  The  availability  of  labour  market 
indicators reduces this number further to 42 countries. While this limits the generality of 
the results, the remaining sample has a fair regional coverage with 7 American (including 
all  three  Northern  American  countries),  10  Asian,  7  Eastern  European  and  15  West 
European  countries  and  Israel,  New  Zealand  and  Australia.  However,  we  do  not  have 
complete  data  for  any  African  country.  The  coverage  with  respect  to  the  level  of 
development is given by 20 out of 42 countries having high real income above $20,000 (in 
PPP),  8  countries  between  $10,000  and  $20,000  and  14  below  $10,000.  The  effective 
sample covers 3 global downturn events in 1991 1998 and 2001
6 and a total of 25 domestic 
crises, 10 in OECD members and 15 in other countries. 
Our analysis is focused on the effects of a crisis or global downturn on employment 
growth and the dynamic adjustment to it. Therefore results are confined to this case and can 
neither be generalized to a positive shock nor can any statements about the  effect on the 
equilibrium level of employment growth be derived from this analysis.  We also do not 
differentiate the size or extent of a given crisis or downturn, and our estimations do not take 
into account differences in terms of the decline or recovery of GDP growth.  Furthermore, 
given the relatively small sample size, we restrict our estimation process to two lags of the 
crisis dummies. Relevant conclusions on the role of policies can therefore only be drawn 
for the immediate impact of the crisis and the first two years of recovery.  Given the 
observed patterns of adjustment, this still captures the mai n fluctuations in employment 
growth caused by a crisis. 
5.  Estimation approach 
We make use of a dynamic model of employment growth. Our focus here is on the 
short run adjustment to crises and global downturns and how the impact differs due to 
country characteristics, in this case, openness to trade and labour market institutions. In 
comparison to a static analysis, this approach has not only the advantage that it explicitly 
takes the dynamic nature of employment growth into account, but it is also well suited to 
make  statements  about  the  speed  of  the  adjustment  process  and  the  persistence  in  the 
deviation from trend growth. The general form of the estimation equation is as follows: 
Equation 1: Model  
Specification 
2 2 2
, , 1 , , , , ,,
, 0 , 0 , 0
c c c c c c
i t i i t l i t l l i t l l i t l i t i t i t
c G D l c G D l c G D l
E E CR CR OPEN CR POLY u         
     
            
 
 
where E stands for employment growth, CR for the crisis dummy, with c=G,D reflecting 
whether the country experienced in the respective year a global downturn and/or domestic 
crisis, OPEN for an indicator of openness, POLY stands for the variables describing labour 
market  institutions,  ʱ  for  country  fixed  effects,  and  the  error  term  is  given  by  u.  All 
variables carry country (i) and time period (t) subscripts.   
 
 
6 The 1980-82 downturn is not an effective part of the sample as our estimation method requires 
lagged employment data for at least two years before the crisis.   
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The combination of a lagged endogenous variable and country fixed effects causes 
OLS estimates to be biased (for a detailed treatment see Nickell (1981) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991)). A possible way to address the panel endogeneity bias is to transform the 
equation by taking the first difference and apply instrumental variable technique, which is 
essentially the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-
Bond (1998) improve on the former by using additionally the level equation and a different 
set of instruments to form a system GMM estimator. We use the latter method to trace out 
the dynamic response of employment to a crisis and to determine how long the economy 
takes to revert to trend growth. We also conduct robustness checks based on a simple OLS 
and fixed effect estimators, which suffer from the endogeneity bias (which is however 
declining in T) but are not sensitive to the choice of the instruments and thus not subject to 
potential biases arising from the use of inadequate instruments. The results do not differ 
significantly from those estimated with our preferred specification.  
6.  Results 
In the following we proceed by assessing first the average response of employment 
growth to different types of crises. In a second step we shed some light on the differential 
responses depending on the underlying domestic conditions. To this end we re-estimate 
equation 1 allowing for OPEN and POLY to affect the pattern of employment growth, 
respectively. The AR test of autocorrelation indicates that there is generally no second 
order autocorrelation which makes the use of instruments from the second lag onwards 
feasible. Generally we restrict the number of instruments to the set of exogenous variables 
and lags of the dependent variable from order two to maximal five. It turns out that no 
lagged dependent variable beyond the first lag is significant. Similarly, irrespective of the 
crisis definition choice, no lagged crisis dummy is significant beyond the second lag. We 
thus decide for an autoregressive distributed lag model of order ADL(1,2). 
6.1  The average crisis effect 
As a baseline specification, we estimate the model setting γl =0  ʴl=0  for all l=0,1,2. 
This gives us the unconditional average response of employment growth to both global 
downturns and domestic crises.7 The right panel of Figure 4 depicts the average pattern for 
a global downturn while the left panel shows the response of employment to a domestic 
banking  or  debt  crisis.  The  solid  line  is  the  estimated  effect  from  the  Arellano-Bover 
estimator  while  the  dashed  line  reflects  the  implied  dynamics  from  the  fixed  effect 
estimator and the dotted line from the OLS estimation. Confidence bands are computed 





7  The  results  are  based  on  a  regression  including  both  global  downturns  and  domestic  crises. 
Including one set of dummies at a time yields close to identical results. We also tested whether there 
is significant interaction between the two by including a third dummy which is the product of the 
domestic crisis and global downturn dummy. It turns out that the latter is insignificant. This implies 
that if a domestic crisis and a global downturn coincide the total drop in employment growth is the 
sum of the drop under a global downturn and a domestic crisis.  
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Figure 4: Average percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend after domestic 
crises (left) and global downturns (right)  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The results point at two major differences between the domestic crises and the global 
downturns.  Not  surprisingly,  the  reduction  in  employment  growth  is  more  pronounced 
during a domestic crisis than under a global downturn, more than two times the extent. The 
effect of the global downturn persists longer on average, with the second lag still having a 
significant negative impact on employment growth, while employment reverts faster after a 
domestic crisis. The similarity between the dynamics under Arellano-Bond estimates and 
fixed effect as well as OLS estimate suggest that the bias of the latter estimator is rather 
small.  
6.2  The role of openness 
To analyze the role of openness we evaluate the response for a low level of trade 
(imports + exports) to GDP of 25% and a high openness level, corresponding to 130%. The 
respective values are the mean openness level in our sample less one standard deviation or 
plus one standard deviation which corresponds roughly to the average openness value for 
the  US  or  Pakistan  in  the  low  openness  case  and  to  the  value  for  the  Netherlands  or 
Bulgaria in the high openness case. We find that in particular during domestic crises, higher 
openness at first leads to a stronger reduction in employment growth, but also allows for a 
faster recovery. The initial negative response in the case of a debt and banking crisis is 
consistent with findings on the importance of access to finance for exporters (See Iacovone 
and Zavacka (2009) or Berman (2009)). Unlike global downturns, bank and debt crises 
have  a  direct  impact  on  the  availability  of  credit  for  firms.  Since  exporters  are  more 
sensitive to changes in external finance conditions, the higher the openness to GDP rate, the 
stronger is the importance of the financial constraint, and the more pronounced the impact 
on employment. Once the constraints are less binding and the real depreciation allows net 
exports to rebound, more open economies can recover more quickly. This channel is also 
supported  by  the  different  dynamics  of  export  growth  in  domestic  crises  vs.  global 
downturns. In the former the reduction is more pronounced but shows also a more profound 
rebound in the following year. Having higher foreign assets (as measured by foreign assets 
to GDP) allows countries to generally curb better with domestic crises since it implies a 
lower  drain  on  the  financial  resources,  avoiding  an  investment  reduction  and  thus 




Figure 5: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend for countries with high 
vs. low trade openness after domestic crises (left) and global downturns (right) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 6: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend for countries with high 
vs. low foreign assets after domestic crises (left) and global downturns (right) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
6.3  The role of labour market institutions 
In a first step we analyze the impact of our measure for severance pay on the effect of 
a crisis. Again, we compare the response if severance pay is one standard deviation below 
the mean with the case in which it is one standard deviation above the mean, holding the 
value of openness at its mean. 
There is a clear positive association of severance pay with a less pronounced drop in 
employment  growth.
8  This is the case for both global downturns and   domestic crises. 
Countries  with a severance pay one standard deviation lower than the average  suffer on 
average twice as large a drop in employment growth than countries  with a severance pay 
one standard deviation above the average . Apparently, firms find it more profitable to 
 
 
8 See chapter 1 of the IMF World Economic Outlook (2009) for a similar finding for the 2008/09 
crisis.  
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adjust to a negative shock through lay-offs when severance pay is low. If severance pay is 
high, firms find it more costly to adjust through lay-offs, and revert to other means of 
adjustment. These could include reductions in wages or working time. Limited availability 
of data does not allow us to test this hypothesis for the entire dataset, but for the sub-sample 
of countries for which we have data on real wages we do indeed find that these drop more 
markedly during a crisis if severance pay is high.  
Figure 7: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend for countries with high 
vs. low severance pay after domestic crises (left) and global downturns (right) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
In  a  second  step,  we  investigate  to  which  extent  unemployment  benefits  alter  the 
response of employment to a crisis by replacing POLY with the share of the previous wage 
that unemployment entitlements cover in the first year after losing a job. It turns out that 
countries which have higher unemployment benefits suffered on average a more severe 
reduction  in employment  growth  during  both  domestic  crises  and  global  downturns.  A 
potential reason for this finding is that unemployment benefits can act as downward real 
wage  rigidities  (see  Campolmi  and  Faia  (2005)  or  Zanetti  (2010)  for  a  theoretical 
foundation). If unemployment benefits are high workers resist a downward correction of 
wages  because they have an outside option and firms faced with high real wages need to 
adjust  along  the  extensive  margin  by  reducing  the  working  force.  This  finding  is  also 
related to the issue of informal employment; workers who do not have access to any type of 
social protection or unemployment benefits can simply not afford to be unemployed and 
thus have to take up informal employment. Boeri et al. (2008), based on a review of the 
literature, point out that this may lead to non-ideal job matches, especially during times of 
transformation.  Thus,  it  is  possible  that  unemployment  benefits,  while  increasing 
unemployment in the short run, actually contribute to a more efficient labour allocation and 









Figure 8: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend for countries with high 
vs. low unemployment benefits after domestic crises (left) and global downturns (right) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Our  results  are  also  in  line  with  findings  by  Boeri  and  Macis  (2010),  both  for 
unemployment benefits and severance pay. The authors find that the introduction of benefit 
schemes led to higher job turnover rates primarily driven by higher job destruction. They 
also  find  this  to  be  the  case  particularly  in  countries  where  employment  protection 
legislation is weak.  
6.4  Robustness checks 
In order to better understand the effects of unemployment benefits and severance pay, 
we perform some robustness checks. We exclude once the lower 20th percentile and once 
the upper 20th percentile of the distribution to determine whether results are non linear in 
the sense that they are driven by countries with either very high or very low unemployment 
benefits or severance pay. As Figure 9 in Annex 1 illustrates, results for severance pay are 
hardly  affected  when  either  excluding  the  top  or  the  lowest  20th  percentile  of  the 
distribution and thus do not appear to be driven by extreme values. For unemployment 
benefits,  the  case  is  somewhat  different.  Results  are  unchanged  when  excluding  the 
countries with the lowest benefits, but become insignificant when excluding the countries 
with  the  highest  unemployment  benefits.  Thus  it  appears  that  there  is  a  non-linear 
relationship between unemployment benefits and their role for cushioning employment. In 
particular, unemployment benefits in the top 20
th percentile seem to exacerbate the negative 
response of employment to a crisis while no significant effect on employment growth is 
detected for unemployment benefits in the rest of the distribution. 
Finally, we re-estimate the relationships excluding rich countries from the sample by 
eliminating any observation for countries with a real GDP per capita income in PPP above 
$20,000 (results are reported in Figure 10 in Annex 1). Although this reduces the sample 
significantly, to about half the size, we find results to be entirely in line with the results 
from the complete sample, although confidence intervals are slightly wider. 
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7.  Application to the 2008/9 crisis 
With the estimation coefficients for both global downturns and domestic crises at hand 
we can simulate the path of employment growth during the 2008/9 crises for any country 
with sufficient data availability based on its openness and labour market institutions. While 
this approach is certainly insufficient for a comprehensive employment forecast, it is a 
useful way to test the applicability of our results to the 2008/9 crisis and to demonstrate the 
economic relevance of labour markets institutions and openness in determining the impact 
of the crisis. We believe that both the domestic crisis and the global downturn coefficients 
are relevant in order to understand the impact of the global economic downturn of 2008/9. 
The whole world experienced a decline in global demand, larger in size but comparable in 
nature  to  previous  global  economic  downturns.  In  addition,  in  a  number  of  countries, 
mainly among the OECD members and former Soviet countries, the financial shock of 
2008/9 triggered domestic banking or debt crises. Typically, these countries were affected 
more severely in terms of employment growth than countries that "only" experienced the 
global demand collapse. 
In  line  with  this  observation,  we  make  the  following  assumption  to  set  up  our 
projection  (a  summary  of  the  assumptions  is  given  in  Annex  2,  Table  2):  The  global 
downturn dummy is dated to 2008. Domestic crises came in various shapes in the period 
from 2008-2010, including (private external) debt related balance of payment crises with 
strong correction in the housing market (Lithuania, Estonia 2008), bank failures or major 
stress in the banking sector with the need for bailouts coupled with stress in the housing 
market (Ireland, UK, USA in 2008, Germany, Belgium 2009) or severe increases in the 
financing of government debt (Portugal, Ireland, Spain 2009) or a quasi default (Greece 
2009). While some of these crises are not exactly in line with the definition by Laeven and 
Valencia  (2008),  they  are  roughly  comparable,  and  we  set  our  domestic  crisis  dummy 
accordingly. 
For some countries it is not exactly clear which scenario is more appropriate. These 
countries include Germany, Belgium, Italy and Hungary and to some extent Turkey. Italy, 
Hungary and Turkey experienced a strong increase in the interest spread on their sovereign 
bonds; however, serious refinancing problems arose only in Hungary that also negotiated a 
loan from the IMF. Additionally, the Hungarian central bank entered in a swap agreement 
with the ECB and the Swiss National Bank to prevent further problems arising from the 
rather high debt in Swiss francs of the private sector. Thus, we provide two estimates for 
Hungary, one based on only a global downturn and one based on a global downturn and a 
simultaneous domestic crisis. Belgium and Germany experienced bank failures. However, 
banks  were  bailed  out  and  thus  a  domestic  banking  crisis  in  the  traditional  sense  was 
prevented. It is thus not entirely clear whether the two countries suffered a domestic crisis 
or  not.  We  provide  estimations  based  on  both  scenarios.  As  expected,  the  actual 
development of employment growth is in between these two responses, which may form a 
reasonable upper and lower bound for the further development. 
For Austria, France and Sweden, there has also been considerable pressure on the 
banking sector. However, we believe that in comparison with the Anglo-Saxon countries 
this has been less severe and thus we do not consider these countries to have suffered a 
domestic banking crisis. The same applies to Italy. The estimates are thus potentially more 
favourable (in fact it turns out that actual employment growth in 2009 for Italy, France and 
Sweden turned out worse than what we predict). 
Furthermore, we need to make an assumption regarding the medium term employment 
growth  rate  for  each  country.  We  use  the  average  growth  rate  of  employment  in  the 
available period until 2006. For the countries which underwent a transformation process in 
the 90s, we use the more recent years from 2003 to 2006 as a basis (otherwise growth rates 
would  be  strongly  negative).  These  countries  include  Estonia,  Lithuania,  Poland  and  
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Hungary. All of these countries were undergoing a long period of employment decline in 
the 90s and early 2000s with employment falling more than 1% in several years.
9 Finally, 
for Turkey and Korea, we also use the average over the period from 2003 to 2006 due to the 
various crises preceding this period.
10  While the numbers are in line with the general 
presumption that employment in emerging markets will grow faster than in d eveloped 
economies, the values for Ireland and in particular Spain may be over optimistic, yielding a 
somewhat less severe reduction than a more conservative medium-run employment growth 
value would yield. 
We use only information up to 2007 to derive the e ntire path until 2012 and contrast 
the predictions to the actual numbers which are available for 2008 and 2009. The 
simulations are based on the model which includes openness and severance pay as 
explanatory variables.  Figure  11  (Annex  3)  shows the path of employment growth for 
several countries after 2007 under the described assumptions. The solid line shows the 
actual value based on ILO data, the dotted line is the prediction starting in 2008. 
Our predictions perform reasonably well in nearly all cases were we assume no 
domestic crisis. Canada may be regarded as the exception ; here, the simulation is more 
favourable than the actual growth in 2009. The failure to capture the  more serious drop is 
probably due to the fact that our approach does not take account of the closeness  to and 
dependence of Canada on the United States. This implies that despite the enormous trade 
collapse and the rather strong world GDP drop, the effect  on employment is on average 
comparable with what we would expect from historical data.  
Simulation results for countries which also experienced a domestic crisis vary in 
accuracy. For the United States, Ireland and Lithuania, results are close to the actual data. 
While Ireland is predicted to recover faster, the simulations for the US suggest continuously 
low employment growth in 2010. The difference in our prediction is caused by the fact that 
the US is a rather closed economy while Ireland is highly open  and should receive a boost 
from net exports. Actual employment growth in the UK declined more moderately than 
predicted while for Spain, the actual decline was larger than the prediction. The rather low 
predicted decline for Spain is linked to the fact that the official severance pay is rather high. 
However, a big share of employment consists of less protected workers in the construction 
industry. Thus, the indicator fails to account appropriately for the rather low severance pay 
in this particular sector where jobs were shed at significant levels. The over -prediction of 
the employment reaction for the UK is potentially due to the failure of our model to account 
for all the policy actions that have been taken to counter the impact of the crisis. For 
Greece, according to the simulation, 2010 will be the toughest year in terms of employment 
growth.  
Germany is a particular interesting case with employment growth being much more 
resilient to the crisis than most people predicted. In fact, our simulations imply  a more 
severe employment drop than what can be observed for 2008 and 2009. There are two 
reasons which may cause our simulation to deviate from the actual data. The first reason is 
that the bailing out of banks and the multitude of stimulus packages are li kely to have 
reduced the impact of the domestic crisis. If we simulate the employment drop for Germany 
assuming only a global downturn and no domestic crisis, we do in fact get much closer to 
 
 
9 For Estonia we exclude also 2006 since it was an outlier with employment growth of more than 6% 
10 While Turkey suffered a prolonged period of employment decline for 4 years starting in 2000, 
Korea suffered the most severe employment shock in the Asian region in 1998 with a d ecline of 
more than 6%.  
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the  actual  data.  Alternatively,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  policies  implemented  by  the 
German  government  had  a  direct  impact  on  the  preferred  adjustment  margin  of  firms. 
Companies reduced working hours and accordingly pay, while the government subsidized 
salaries of workers. This made it cheaper for firms to keep the workers and have them work 
fewer hours, since firing some (and having the others work fulltime) would have implied 
increased costs of searching for qualified new workers once the crisis is over. Similar to 
higher severance pay, this policy thus favours the adjustment via wages and hours rather 
than  quantity  of  employment.  However,  this  policy  measure  is  not  captured  in  our 
severance pay variable. If we simulate the employment growth path under an increased 
value of our indicator (assuming that a subsidy to keeping workers has a similar effect to 
imposing a cost on laying them off), we can in fact match the employment growth path of 
Germany.  
Although we believe that the simulation results render support to the hypothesis of the 
relevance  of  openness  and  labour  market  institutions  for  the  adjustment  path  of 
employment growth to shocks, some caveats remain: The method is very simplistic and 
should not be taken as a forecast, which would have to be based on much more information 
than  what  is  available  in  our  framework.  In  particular,  no  information  on  the  path  of 
recovery of the global economy is contained in the predictions. We also do not include the 
ad-hoc policy measures that have been taken during the crisis, and thus estimate a ceteris 
paribus  response  had  the  crisis  gone  unmitigated  rather  than  a  prediction  of  what  can 
actually be expected to happen. 
8.  Conclusions 
The global economic crisis of 2008/09 has had severe repercussions for global output. 
While employment responses have been similarly dramatic, they did not necessarily mirror 
the divergence in output declines one-for-one. Our research provides some explanations for 
this divergence that are of relevance for policymaking during crises. First, domestic crises 
have a much larger impact on employment growth than global downturns. This emphasizes 
that  the  first  and  perhaps  most  important  line  of  defence  for  countries  is  to  protect 
themselves against contagion of financial crises. Sound macroeconomic policies should be 
at the core of the defence strategy.  
Second, deeper integration into the world economy leads to a deeper and faster initial 
slowdown of employment growth, particularly during domestic crises, but also to faster and 
sharper recovery. Adopting protectionist policies as a crisis unfolds thus seems like very 
bad advice. At the same time, this confirms that trade openness can contribute to higher 
volatility in the labour market and thus increases the need for an effective system of social 
protection.  
In terms of labour market policies, high severance pay seems to have been effective in 
encouraging companies to adjust to crises through means other than lay-offs. While not 
explicitly tested in our research, we believe that our findings can be generalized to say that 
policies that affect the cost-benefit calculation associated with laying off workers can be 
quite effective during crises. Apart from severance pay, another example for such a policy 
that is often quoted as a success story is the German scheme for “Kurzarbeit”. Under this 
program, the government temporarily subsidized schemes for reduced working hours and 
thus creates an incentive to keep workers on payroll despite lower demand.   
With respect to unemployment benefits, our results are somewhat mixed. Our research 
does not call into question the importance of unemployment benefits as a means to protect 
workers against the social impact of a crisis. However, it points to a potential trade-off 
between maintaining high unemployment benefits and the goal to minimize employment 
losses during a crisis. Our results also indicate that the relationship between unemployment 
benefits and employment during crises seems to be non-linear with the potentially negative  
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effects on driven by the countries with the highest unemployment benefits in the sample.  
Additional research on this topic, in particular taking into account the role of informal 
employment and potential efficiency losses from sub-optimal job matching in the absence 
of unemployment benefits, is highly desirable.  
Unfortunately, further research on the topic of this paper remains difficult due to data 
limitations. This prevents more accurate research into a number of important questions in 
this context, such as the effect of other labour market policies, the impact of crises on 
wages, working hours, and informality, and the differences in the employment impact by 
industrial sectors. This underlines the need for the international community to continue and 
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Figure 9: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend after domestic crises 
(left) and global downturns (right), excluding highest or lowest 20th percentile for policy variables 
 




Figure 10: Percentage point deviation of employment growth from its long term trend after domestic crises 








Table 2: Assumptions for application of estimations to the global crisis of 2008/9 
 
 
All countries are assumed to have experienced a global downturn in 2008. 
Source:  Medium run growth is defined as the average annual growth rate over the entire sample period, except for former Soviet and Warsaw pact 
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